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This paper shows that while China now attaches geostrategic importance to Taiwan, it has not 
always done so. It has only accorded such significance to Taiwan in the post-Mao era. By 
reviewing how Taiwan became a Japanese colony, how it came under the control of Chiang 
Kai-shek’s government, and how it came to be seen by the government of the People’s 
Republic of China as a sacred territory before being deemed geostrategically significant, this 
paper seeks to demonstrate that Taiwan’s importance to China is not based on geography, an 
immutable factor. Instead, it was the result of contingencies of history and the changed 
calculations of succeeding governments in China. This leads to the important conclusion that 
the geostrategic importance the Chinese government now attaches to Taiwan may change if 
the Chinese leadership alters its strategic calculus or if the government itself is replaced. 
KEYWORDS: Cairo Conference, first island chain, imagined geography, sacred territory, 
strategic calculation 
 
Since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) describes Taiwan as a "sacred territory" in its 
constitution, it is reasonable to assume that it attaches central importance to Taiwan.1 The 
 
1 National People’s Congress of the PRC, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 
accessed September 12, 2016, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-
11/15/content_1372962.htm. 
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PRC government now further considers Taiwan of geostrategic importance, for which the late 
political scientist Alan Wachman gave intellectual underpinning.2 The description of a 
particular territory as "sacred" cannot imply other territories not so labelled are not. It is, 
therefore, essentially political rhetoric and can be dropped should there be a change of 
regime, government, or even priorities. The same applies, perhaps to a lesser extent, to the 
strategic value attributed to a territory. Whether a territory is of strategic importance or not is 
ultimately a judgment of a government based on its intentions and its assessment of the value 
of a territory to fulfill its priorities in matters of national security.  
In contrast, geography is a constant rather than a variable factor. Geostrategic 
significance or strategic significance based on geography is generally deemed long-standing 
rather than ephemeral. Thus, a geostrategically important territory is one for which its 
strategic value is based primarily on its location and/or topography; it is a territory that is 
vital for the long-term security of the state. Thus, the geostrategic importance of, say, the 
Black Sea region to Russia, the Strait of Hormuz to Iran, or the Strait of Malacca to Malaysia 
or Indonesia is not dependent on who is in control of the respective countries. Consequently, 
a sovereign power, regardless of shifting party politics, is prepared to pay a substantial price 
to hold, defend, recover, or secure a geostrategically important territory. Even if a country is 
not in a position to hold or recover it, it will not refrain from making a commitment to do so.  
The PRC’s solemn pledge to use force if unavoidable to secure Taiwan regardless of 
risks and costs suggests that it does see geostrategic value in Taiwan.3 This can be seen to 
 
2 Alan M. Wachman, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), esp. 29–37. 




imply that whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) stays in control of China or not, the 
government of China will seek the incorporation of Taiwan.  
This paper challenges the last point and posits that Taiwan’s geostrategic importance 
to China, being relatively recent, is in reality contextually derived and dynamic rather than 
geographically determined and immutable.4 A territory is deemed to be strategically 
important or not primarily on the basis of its value for serving the strategic ambition of the 
government concerned, and that can change as the strategic objective or ambition or the 
security doctrine of the state shifts. Hence, while the PRC government has in the last three 
decades incorporated Taiwan’s location into its calculation of the island’s strategic value, its 
approach reflects that it still sees Taiwan’s significance more in general strategic terms than 
in specific geostrategic terms.  
This paper assesses Taiwan’s geostrategic importance to China by examining the 
changing historical circumstances that transformed the island from a Japanese colony into the 
PRC’s geostrategically important and "sacred" territory. It ascertains the prices successive 
governments in control of China were prepared to pay to secure Taiwan at various crucial 
points in history, particularly in 1895, the 1940s, the 1950s, and since the 1980s. It probes not 
 
Premier Warns against ‘Taiwan Independence,’" Washington Post, March 16, 2000, accessed 
September 12, 2016, http://fas.org/news/china/2000/eng20000316N101.htm. 
4 Edward Friedman took the view that the PRC government has never put Taiwan at the top 
of its priority in security terms and has never shown any willingness to risk a war with the 
United States over Taiwan. Edward Friedman, "Peace or War with Taiwan in China’s 
Foreign Policy," in Jon Sullivan and Chun-yi Lee, eds., A New Era in Democratic Taiwan: 
Trajectories and Turning Points in Politics and Cross-Strait Relations (Abingdon, UK: 
Routledge, 2018), 123–41. 
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only the roles played by the CCP but also that played by the Guomindang (GMD) in this 
process of transformation. It contests the premise that the PRC’s approach has always been 
governed by geostrategic considerations and shows that this only became a significant 
consideration in the post-Mao period. This paper also puts forth the case that changes in 
overall capabilities and strategic conception were responsible for Beijing’s understanding of 
Taiwan’s geostrategic value. 
 
 
<A> The Symbolism of the Treaty of Shimonoseki versus the Peripheral Significance of 
Taiwan 
Notwithstanding Chinese official statements since 1950, Taiwan was, in fact, historically of 
peripheral importance to mainland China. The Manchus founded the Qing Empire in 1644 
and took control of the rest of mainland China from the Ming Empire in 1650. But for 
another three decades it ignored Taiwan, then under the control of the family of Zheng 
Chenggong (鄭成功 1624–1662), a pirate of both Han and Japanese parentage who had 
seized Taiwan from the Dutch as the Ming Empire crumbled. This happened even though 
Zheng professed loyalty to the defunct Ming royal family. The fact that the Qing, one of the 
mightiest of empires in its time, did not attempt to take Taiwan for so long confirmed that 
Taiwan was not seen to be of great geostrategic value to it. It finally took Taiwan after the 
Zheng family unsuccessfully supported the rebellion of former Ming generals led by Wu 
Sangui (吳三桂 1612–1678) on the mainland. Indeed, after the Qing conquered Taiwan in 
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1683 it administered Taiwan as a frontier region appended to Fujian province.5 The Qing 
government only elevated Taiwan to provincial status in 1885 in order to preempt foreign 
imperial ambition over the island.6 This policy failed as the Qing ceded Taiwan to Japan after 
losing a war over Korea to Japan a decade later. The defeat and the harsh terms of the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki (1895) unleashed forces for a republican revolution that brought down the 
Qing within two decades.7  
There is no evidence that Qing substantially revised its view on the geostrategic 
importance of Taiwan in the nineteenth century.8 If Qing policy makers had started to see 
Taiwan as geostrategically vital, they would have deployed significant forces there, fortified 
it, or tried to avoid its cession. None of this happened. Qing’s weakness vis-à-vis Japan did 
 
5 Bruce Jacobs argued that Taiwan was never Chinese since the Qing Empire was Manchu, 
and thus Taiwan, like China proper, was merely a Manchu colony. Bruce Jacobs, 
Democratizing Taiwan (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 19–23. 
6 Steve Tsang, "Putting Chinese Unity and the Relations between Taiwan and Mainland 
China into a Historical Context," in Gunter Schucher and Margot Schuller, eds., Perspective 
on Cross-Strait Relations: Views from Europe (Hamburg: Mitteilungen des Instituts fur 
Asienkunde, 2005), 21. 
7 Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), accessed September 12, 2016, 
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/shimonoseki01.htm. 
8 Even Japan did not annex Taiwan because of its geostrategic importance. Victory in 1895 
generated a popular demand for territorial acquisition, and Tokyo picked Taiwan primarily 
because it would not risk provoking an intervention from the Western powers and because its 
navy considered Taiwan useful. Edward I-te Chen, "Japan’s Decision to Annex Taiwan: A 
Study of Ito-Mutsu Diplomacy, 1894–95," Journal of Asian Studies 37, no. 1 (1977): 61–72. 
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not stop it from working to stop the cession of Liaodong (遼東), also demanded by Japan. 
The Qing worked with Russia, France, and Germany to avert the loss of Liaodong—which 
was strategically located for maritime access to Beijing—by substantially increasing the 
indemnity to Japan. It did not attempt the same for Taiwan. Indeed, when the Taiwanese 
resisted Japanese occupation, the Qing government offered them no help, though some 
Chinese ignored government policy and went to Taiwan to join the resistance.9 The reality 
was that cession of Taiwan, geographically remote from Beijing, was treated in a way not 
fundamentally different from the treatment of Hong Kong half a century earlier. There is no 
evidence to suggest Beijing saw greater value in Taiwan’s geography and strategic value in 
1895 than it had seen in those of Hong Kong when it ceded it to Britain.  
Changes in military technologies and strategic goals of states affect how a territory is 
evaluated in terms of its geostrategic value, and it is tempting to make such a case 
retrospectively. The geostrategic significance Taiwan could have for China in the late 
twentieth century and the early twenty-first century was not recognized by the government in 
control of China a century or half a century earlier.  
The real significance of the Treaty of Shimonoseki for China was that it marked a 
turning point in its modern history. What galvanized Chinese intellectuals and officials to 
attempt basic reforms or a revolution was not the loss of a geostrategically vital territory 
called Taiwan but the demonstrated incapacity of the Qing to respond to challenges mounted 
by a modernizing Asian neighbor it had previously considered inferior. The treaty showed the 
bankruptcy of Qing’s earlier reforms and unleashed forces that led to its collapse.  
 
9 Li Xiaofeng and Lin Chengrong, Taiwan shi [History of Taiwan] (Taipei: Huali tushu, 
2003), 149–59.  
7 
The reality was that Taiwan did not figure strongly in China’s national imagination 
prior to the start of the Pacific War in 1941. Historian Steven Philips was right that "from 
1895 until the late 1930s, no Chinese government—Qing Empire, Nationalist Republic, or 
Communist Soviet—had a realistic chance of restoring sovereignty over the island, and no 
leader of these entities made Taiwan a major issue in domestic politics or relations with 
Japan."10 But if Taiwan had been of real geostrategic importance, its eventual recovery would 
have been made into a nationalist rallying cry. It was not. Historian Shi-chi Mike Lan also 
has demonstrated persuasively that while there were incidental narratives in China that 
referred to the Taiwanese as compatriots, the mainstream view across the spectrum saw 
Taiwan as separate from China, generally in terms not much different from that of the former 
vassal state Korea.11 Taiwan was not part of China’s "imagined geography" in this period.12 
Even those who considered the Taiwanese to be compatriots saw a "Taiwanese independence 
movement" and a "Taiwanese national liberation movement" as "efforts of the Taiwanese, by 
the Taiwanese, and for the Taiwanese."13 Taiwan’s status as a Japanese colony was widely 
 
10 S. E. Phillips, "Confronting Colonization and National Identity: The Nationalists and 
Taiwan, 1941–45," Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 2, no. 3 (2001): 2. 
11 Shi-chi Mike Lan, "The Ambivalence of National Imagination: Defining ‘The Taiwanese’ 
in China, 1931–1941," China Journal, no. 64 (July 2010): 179–97. 
12 This concept is borrowed from Emma Jinhua Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: 
Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004).  
13 Lan, "Ambivalence of National Imagination," 195. 
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accepted in China prior to the Pacific War, just like Hong Kong’s status as a British colony.14 
No leader of China saw Taiwan as worth a significant price.  
The CCP’s position was summed up by Mao Zedong when he met with the American 
journalist Edgar Snow in the 1930s.15 Mao stated that "it is the immediate task of China to 
regain all our lost territories,” but he specified that the CCP did "not, however, include 
Korea, formerly a Chinese colony" and that "the same thing applies for Taiwan."16 Until then, 
there had been only one occasion on which a senior CCP leader had articulated a different 
view. In an essay about human races and the international Communist movement published 
in 1924, Li Dazhao (李大釗)wrote that in light of shared history and culture Taiwan "should 
not be separated from the Chinese nation."17 This was an aberration, never repeated or 
adopted as party policy.  
The first time the CCP addressed Taiwan as a policy issue was at its Sixth National 
Congress in 1928. This occurred three months after the Taiwan Communist Party (TCP) was 
formed by nine Taiwanese on April 14, 1928.18 The TCP manifesto specified that the 
 
14 On the case of Hong Kong, see Steve Tsang, Hong Kong: An Appointment with China 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 17–33. 
15 Frank Hsiao and Lawrence Sullivan, "The Chinese Communist Party and the Status of 
Taiwan, 1928–1943," Pacific Affairs 52, no. 3 (1979): 446–67. 
16 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (Hammondsworth, UK: Pelican, 1972), 128. 
17 Li Dazhao, Li Dazhao wenji [Collected works of Li Dazhao], vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin 
chubanshe, 1984), 766.  
18 Gao Mingshi, ed., Taiwan shi [Taiwan history] (Taipei: Guojia tushuguan, 2009), 199. 
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organization was to be a subchapter of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and advocated 
the independence of Taiwan.19  
Adhering closely to the position of the Comintern, the CCP embraced the TCP as a 
subset of the JCP and supported Taiwanese and Korean independence.20 The CCP described 
"the Taiwanese in Fujian" as a minority nationality alongside the Mongols, Hui, Manchus, 
Koreans, Miao, Li, and peoples of Xinjiang and Tibet.21  
Mao’s statement to Snow merely reflected the position of the Comintern. Taiwan was 
not a controversial issue within the fractious CCP. Its leadership did not see potential 
geostrategic significance in Taiwan. When the CCP negotiated with the GMD to form the 
United Front at the start of the War of Resistance against Japan in 1937, Zhou Enlai talked 
about working with the Taiwanese and the Koreans against Japanese oppression.22 Zhou 
 
19 Lu Xiuyi, Riju shidai Taiwan gongchandang shi [History of the Communist Party of 
Taiwan in the era of Japanese rule] (Taipei: Qianwei chubanshe, 1989), 211–17. 
20 Resolution of the CCP Central Committee, 25 December 1935, in Zhongyang wenxian 
yanjiushi [Central Documentary Research Office], comp., Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian 
xuanji [Selected documents of the Party Central of the CCP] (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao 
chubanshe, 1991), vol. 7, 772.  
21 Resolution on the nationality problem, 9 July 1928, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian 
xuanji, vol. 4, 388. The CCP was not exceptional in this; Chinese newspapers in the early 
twentieth century often saw Taiwanese and other minorities in not dissimilar terms. 
22 Telegram from Zhou Enlai, 2 May 1937, 080104-009, 08A-01391, Tejiao dang’an 
[Archives on special missions], Chiang Kai-shek Papers, Academia Historica, Taipei. On the 
start of the war and how Chiang reached a decision on the United Front, see Steve Tsang 
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again treated Taiwan as an external partner in 1941 in an article in Xinhua ribao (新华日报 
New China daily), which stressed that the Chinese nation should work with the anti-Japanese 
movement in Taiwan as well as the anti-German movements in the Balkans and Africa.23  
Until the Pacific War started in December 1941, the CCP’s position on Taiwan was 
not different from that of the GMD or from the general sentiments of the country. Little was 
said about Taiwan. Even Chiang Kai-shek, whose views during the war would bring about a 
basic change to Chinese policy, was largely silent on Taiwan beforehand.  
The first time Chiang raised the issue was as the War of Resistance was raging. He 
did so in a speech about the future of the GMD and China’s resistance, at a conference of 
GMD national representatives on April 1, 1938, after losing strategically important parts of 
northern and eastern China. The speech was meant to boost morale in the midst of the crucial 
Battle of Taierzhuang (臺兒莊). There Chinese forces fought ferociously to stop Japan’s 
military, which was building up momentum after capturing Shanghai and Nanjing.24 Chiang 
 
"Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘Secret Deal’ at Xian and the Start of the Sino-Japanese War," Palgrave 
Communications 1, no. 1 (2015): 7–8. 
23 Zhou Enlai, "Minzu zhishang guojia zhishang," Xinhua ribao [New China daily], June 15, 
1941, 1.  
24 Taierzhuang was not a great battlefield success: it merely disabled one Japanese division. 
But stopping the Japanese military momentum eased pressure on Chiang to surrender and 
was very significant. Li Zongren and Tang Degang, Li Zongren huiyilu [Memoirs of Li 
Zongren] (Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1986), 479–80. 
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declared that the GMD should strive to "recover Korea and Taiwan."25 While the articulation 
of this ambition was noteworthy, Chiang still emphatically put Taiwan in the same category 
as Korea.  
 
<A>Beginning of a Change in Attitude 
The start of the Pacific War, marked by Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, fundamentally 
changed the context in which Chiang looked at the war. Chiang saw it as presenting "an 
opportunity of a thousand years."26 He promptly declared war on Japan, something he had 
desisted from doing for four years, and worked to forge an alliance with the great powers led 
by the United States.27 Chiang linked the wars in East Asia, Europe, and elsewhere into a 
global conflict.28 He saw this as a turning point that would enable China to emerge as one of 
the victors, after barely managing to survive the Japanese onslaught. He started to think about 
war goals beyond avoiding defeat.  
 
25 Qin Xiaoyi, comp., Zhongtong Jianggong sixiang yanlun zhongji [Complete collection of 
the thoughts and words of President Chiang Kai-shek] (Taipei: Zhongguo guomindang 
zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui, 1984), vol. 15, 186–88. Chiang did note that 
Korea was a former vassal, whereas Taiwan had been part of China. 
26 [Instructions on our policy in the Pacific War], 8 December 1941, 080103-055, 08A-
01311, Tejiao dang’an, Chiang Kai-shek Papers, Academia Historica, Taipei. 
27 "Shilüe gaoben" [Brief draft chronicle of events], entry for 8 December 1941, Chiang Kai-
shek Papers, Academia Historica, Taipei. 
28 "Jiang Jieshi riji" [Chiang Kai-shek’s diary], entry for 9 December 1941, Hoover 
Institution, Stanford University. 
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Contrary to popular belief, Chiang did not declare war on Japan intending to wait for 
the Allied powers to crush Japan. He sought to gain access to the vast resources of the 
Allies.29 He hoped victory would make China a partner with the great powers and end the 
unequal treaties.30 It was with this in mind that he ordered the most powerful strategic 
reserve, which became the Chinese Expeditionary Force, not to reinforce Changsha against a 
formidable Japanese assault but to help Britain hold Burma, with a separate force sent to 
assist the British defense of Hong Kong.31 Securing Burma also served a strategic interest, as 
it was the last land route the United States could employ to supply China.32 To Chiang, 
demonstrating Chinese military prowess in front of the Allied powers was at least as 
important as keeping the Burma Road open. In the end, the Burma Campaign cost China 
 
29 "Shilüe gaoben," entry for 13 December 1941. 
30 He Husheng, Banian Kangzhan zhong de Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek in the midst of the 
eight-year War of Resistance] (Taipei: Fengyun chubanshe, 2011), 287–88; "Jiang Jieshi 
riji," entry for 20 December 1941. 
31 Britain lost Hong Kong before the Chinese relief column could reach Hong Kong. The 
Expeditionary Army consisted of three corps, including the last partially motorized elite 
corps (the Fifth and Sixth) that incorporated the only mechanized division (the 200th). 
Various telegrams from Chiang to Stilwell, 080103-055, 08A-01312, Tejiao dang’an, Chiang 
Kai-shek Papers, Academia Historica, Taipei. Among all Allied forces in Burma, the Chinese 
put up the toughest fight. 
32 Xie Hingyu, Ying yang guo wei [Showing off national strength like an eagle] (Taipei: 
Dongda tushu gongshi, 1997), 53. 
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dearly,33 as its only strategic reserve that had tanks and substantial artillery to give it 
offensive capacity was largely lost and the land route to India was closed. Consequently, 
Chiang’s forces could not mount another major offensive until the Second Burma Campaign 
was launched from India in 1944 by a new army raised, trained, and equipped by the United 
States in India.  
The incapacity of China to attack aggressively undermined Chiang’s scope to 
persuade the Allies to accommodate his wartime demands. Notwithstanding the ebb and flow 
of military fortune, Chiang started to review his options. His thinking on Taiwan and other 
former Chinese dependencies evolved as China’s fortune and standing changed during the 
war. The process started after China declared war on Japan in December 1941, at which point 
the Chinese government considered all previous bilateral treaties between them null and 
void.34 
The prospect that China would win affected how senior GMD figures spoke about 
Taiwan. Some echoed Chiang’s optimism and articulated a new ambition. The first 
manifestation happened at a public rally in April 1942 organized by a small Taiwanese group 
loosely affiliated with the GMD, the Taiwan Geming Tongmenghui (臺灣革命同盟會), 
 
33 The Chinese casualty figure is under dispute. The official history suggests it was roughly 
60,000 of a deployed force of 100,000. Huang Daoxuan has suggested it was closer to 40,000 
of a deployed force of 70,000. Huang Daoxuan, “Miandian zhangyi Jiang Jieshi, Shi Diwei 
de Shibai zeran" [Responsibility for failure between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell in the 
Burma Campaign], Kangri zhanzheng yanjiu [Research into the War of Resistance against 
Japan] 2 (2001): 128–30. 
34 [Draft declaration of war against Japan], December 1941, 080101-015 08A-00069, Tejiao 
dang’an, Chiang Kai-shek Papers, Academia Historica, Taipei. 
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which advocated that Taiwan should rejoin China. The president of the Legislative Yuan, Sun 
Ke (孫科 1891-1973), explained that while there had been hitherto no prospect that Taiwan 
could be recovered he now felt confident that China would defeat Japan and would then 
welcome Taiwan to rejoin mother China.35 But he did not see the recovery of Taiwan as a 
matter of strategic importance or indicate a willingness to pay a price for it. Senior general 
Feng Yuxian (馮玉祥 1882–1948) went further and stressed that China could and should do 
so by working with the Allied powers.36 The government news agency, Central News, gave 
positive coverage, which was carried not only in GMD-friendly newspapers but also in the 
Communist Xinhua ribao.37 This happened at the only time when China stood relatively tall 
among the Allies during the war. Chiang’s forces had just repulsed the Japanese advance on 
Changsha, the Chinese Expeditionary Force had outperformed the British in Burma, and the 
United States had not yet launched the Doolittle Raid—the first counterattack after Pearl 
Harbor. The articulation of such views was noteworthy but did not amount to a policy 
change. 
 
35 Sun Ke, "Jiefang yizai muqian le" [Liberation is in sight], in Zhang Ruicheng, Kangzhan 
shiqi shoufu Taiwan zhi zhongyao yanlu [Important speeches on recovering Taiwan during 
the War of Resistance against Japan] (Taipei: Guomingtang zhongyang weiyuanhui, 1990), 
22. 
36 Feng Yuxian, "Women yao ganjin shoufu Taiwan" [We should recover Taiwan without 
delay], Zhang, Kangzhan shiqi shoufu Taiwan zhi zhongyao yanlun, 19.  
37 Xinhua ribao, April 5, 1942.  
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While the Communist-controlled media reported such activities positively,38 no senior 
CCP leader departed from the standard Comintern position. The CCP Central Committee 
reaffirmed its long-standing position by referring to the Taiwanese together with the Koreans 
and Vietnamese in one breath, and it supported their struggle for independence on the day 
China declared war on Japan.39 It continued to refer to "the Chinese, the peoples of the 
Southern Ocean, the Korean people, and the Taiwanese people" in its declaration to 
commemorate the sixth anniversary of the start of the War of Resistance, in July 1943.40 
There is no record of the CCP modifying its position on Taiwan prior to the Cairo 
Conference. 
 
<A>All Change at Cairo  
By October 1942 Chiang had adjusted his thinking on Taiwan and other Chinese territories 
that Japan had seized from China.41 This followed his engagement with the Western powers 
 
38 Liu Xiaoyuan, A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States and Their Policies for 
the Postwar Disposition of the Japanese Empire 1941–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1966), 163. 
39 Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu taipingyang fanri tongyi zhanxian de zhishi [CCP Central’s 
anti-Japanese United Front directives), Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Zhonggong 
zhongyang wenjian xuanji (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), vol. 13, 251. 
40 Jiefang ribao [Liberation daily], July 2, 1943. I am grateful to Dr S.C. Yin for drawing my 
attention to the CCP position on Taiwan in 1942. 
41 "Shilüe gaoben," entry for 6 October 1942. The Americans winning a decisive victory in 
the Battle of Midway no doubt reinforced Chiang’s confidence of an Allied victory, but he 
had been confident of victory from the start of the Pacific War, as explained above. 
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to negotiate the end of the "unequal treaties."42 His government sought the early return of 
Hong Kong’s New Territories from Britain. When the Chinese requested American support 
over Hong Kong, the Americans declined because they needed British cooperation to win the 
war. Instead, they indicated readiness to see Japan retrocede Manchuria and Taiwan to 
China.43 It was this knowledge that gave Chiang confidence to include Taiwan on a list of 
lost territories he would like to recover when he met President Franklin Roosevelt.44 Chiang 
had not articulated any recognition of specific geostrategic value in Taiwan.45 
Indeed, it was only on the last day of the Cairo Conference in November 1943 that 
Chiang asked for Taiwan. Cairo was one of many Allied wartime summits, though it was the 
only one in which China’s leader took part. Roosevelt told Chiang that he wanted to forge a 
"full blown partnership of China, Great Britain, Russia and the US."46 In reality, he was more 
 
42 John W. Garver, "China’s Wartime Diplomacy," in James Hsiung and Steven Levine, eds., 
China’s Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937–1945 (Armonk, NY: East Gate, 1992), 10. 
43 Telegram from Wellington Koo (London) to Chiang Kai-shek, 15 October 1943, 080106-
016, 08A-01509, Tejiao dang’an, Chiang Kai-shek Papers, Academia Historica, Taipei.  
44 Report of Guo Binkai, 20 December 1943, 080106-022, 08A-01533, Tejiao dang’an, 
Chiang Kai-shek Papers, Academia Historica, Taipei.  
45 In China’s Destiny, a propaganda book issued in his name in 1943, Chiang did refer to all 
territories of the Qing Empire as organic parts of China as a whole that should be taken back. 
Wachman thought this suggested that Taiwan, among all "lost territories,” was considered of 
geostrategic value. Wachman, Why Taiwan?, 80–81. Chiang’s words were much too general 
to indicate he saw specific geostrategic value in Taiwan. 
46 Telegram from Roosevelt to Chiang, 28 October 1943, 080103-057, 08A-01321, Tejiao 
dang’an, Chiang Kai-shek Papers, Academia Historica, Taipei.  
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modest: he wanted "to buoy the ego and spirit of Chiang and to insure that China would not 
make a separate peace with Japan" and free up Japanese forces there for fighting the 
Americans elsewhere.47 The British prime minister, Winston Churchill, for his part, did not 
see much value in the meeting.48 He prioritized the invasion of France and went to Cairo to 
accommodate Roosevelt.49 For Chiang, this was a meeting of historic importance.50 For days 
he pondered over the most important issues to raise,51 and on the day he left for Cairo he 
finally decided on the following, in order of importance:  
a. The international political order; 
b. The organization of the Far Eastern Commission; 
 
47 Ronald Ian Heiferman, The Cairo Conference of 1943: Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang Kai-
shek and Madame Chiang (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2011), 2. Since the United States and 
the United Kingdom did not intend to provide the forces and materiel required for a major 
offensive in Burma, as Chiang requested, the risk that Chiang might negotiate with the 
Japanese for a separate peace became a concern to Roosevelt. 
48 Heiferman, Cairo Conference, 59. 
49 Andrew Roberts, Masters and Commanders: How Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall and 
Alanbrooke Won the War in the West (London: Allen Lane, 2008), 425–30. 
50 "Jiang Jieshi riji," entry for 7 November 1943 (reflections on previous week). 
51 For earlier discussions and the changing lists of key issues, see "Shilüe gaoben," entries for 
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c. The formation of a combined chiefs of staff among China, Britain, and the United 
States; 
d. A plan for managing occupied territories; 
e. Planning for the counteroffensive in Burma; 
f. The independence of Korea; and  
g. Getting a promise for the return of Manchuria and Taiwan.52 
It was only after he arrived in Cairo that Chiang realized this was a working meeting, 
and he adapted as best as he could. He now listed the securing of Allied naval and air support 
to reopen the Burma Road as the top priority, followed by the return of Manchuria, Taiwan, 
and the Pescadores, and followed further by other postwar settlement issues, including the 
independence of Korea and Thailand, as well as the transfer of Japanese assets and military 
hardware in China to his government.53 The summit proved a difficult one. All three leaders 
worked toward different priorities, and Chiang’s main demand—for naval and air support for 
the Burma Campaign—was deemed unrealistic by the others.  
Before the summit was over, Roosevelt realized that he needed to send Chiang home 
"with ammunition to solidify his position in the GMD hierarchy and reinforce his popularity 
with the Chinese people."54 Thus, even though four days of deliberation had failed to deliver 
a plan for the war in 1944, the summiteers took only an hour to draft and agree to a short 
press communique.55 It incorporated significant elements of an original Chinese text, which 
stipulated: "The territory that Japan has so treacherously stolen from the Chinese, such as 
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Manchuria and Formosa, and Bonnin Islands [sic], will of course be returned to the Republic 
of China. All of the conquered territory taken by violence and greed by the Japanese will be 
freed from their clutches."56  
The most important and pertinent part of the communique, which has since then been 
known as the Cairo Declaration, states:  
It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific 
which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 
1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as 
Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of 
China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has 
taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the 
enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea 
shall become free and independent.57 
Although Chiang failed to secure the higher priorities he had set when he left for 
Cairo, he was satisfied. In his diary, he acknowledged that he had made the greatest 
achievements in the political sphere, highlighting in particular the promised return of 
Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores, as well as the independence of Korea.58  
The future of Taiwan and the other named territories were decided by the summiteers 
not because of their strategic value but because it was the one compromise they could reach. 
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It happened because Roosevelt "believed that a display of generosity, gratuitous offerings of 
enemy territory to the Chinese … would persuade Chiang to stay in the war against Japan."59  
As a wartime summit the Cairo conference did little to enable the Allied powers to 
refine their military strategy. It also did not help China’s war efforts in getting support for the 
Burma Campaign, in significantly increasing the airlift of materiel to China, or in securing 
financial aid to ease pressure on the economy. But it remains a historically important event, 
since the final communique became the basis for successive Chinese governments to claim 
sovereignty over Taiwan. It came to be treated as the first wartime Allied "agreement" on the 
future of Taiwan (and, for that matter, Korea). After Cairo, Chiang worked on the assumption 
that Taiwan would be returned to China after the war and instructed his staff to start planning 
for its recovery.60 When Japan surrendered, he dispatched two corps to take over Taiwan.61 
This raised no eyebrows in Washington, London, Yan'an, or Moscow, in none of which 
Taiwan was considered of strategic value. 
The Chinese military occupation of Taiwan took place in accordance with Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers General Order No. One, issued by General Douglas 
MacArthur.62 Under international law, Taiwan’s status would be determined at the peace 
conference, and Chinese forces merely occupied Taiwan temporarily on behalf of the Allied 
powers. Chiang’s government worked on a different premise. It believed its declaration of 
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war had nullified the Treaty of Shimonoseki. It thought it had resumed jurisdiction over 
Taiwan on the basis of the Cairo Declaration as well as Japan’s signing of the instrument of 
surrender.63 A year later, Chiang intended to take advantage of what the Japanese had 
accomplished in Taiwan and the fact that it was free from Communist influence to make it 
into a model province.64 He also used Taiwan’s resources, be they agricultural produce or 
manpower, to support the civil war on the Chinese mainland. For two years or a bit longer 
after taking over Taiwan, Chiang did not expect to lose the Chinese Civil War and could not 
have planned to turn it into his last redoubt. Geostrategic value did not figure at this point.  
 
<A>The CCP’s Responses 
The leading Communist-run newspapers applauded the Cairo Declaration when it was 
released. While Xinhua ribao and Jiefang ribao (解放日报 Liberation daily) expressed 
excitement and confidence of victory, their editorials merely mentioned the prospective 
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return of Taiwan in passing.65 The Cairo Declaration did not result in a review of the CCP’s 
position on Taiwan. Taiwan continued to come under the JCP, not the CCP. When the CCP 
Central sent an instruction to Deng Xiaoping in East China following Cairo, it merely warned 
Deng that Japan might retaliate militarily and urged Deng to be prepared.66 For a year the 
CCP did not adjust to the prospect that Taiwan could be recovered. It was not until the 
Seventh Party Congress of April 1945 that Mao mentioned Taiwan for the first time after 
Cairo. Even then, he did so in passing. He said that the conference made a "good decision, 
namely, that the four northeastern provinces, Taiwan, and the Pescadores should be returned 
to China."67 This statement was made before Mao knew Japan would surrender that summer. 
The general expectation at the time was that it would be at least another year or two before 
Japan could be defeated. Mao did not commit forces to Taiwan, but he ordered the 
Communists to fight for Manchuria. While Mao would welcome Taiwan becoming a part of 
China, he did not see it as being of strategic value, as he did Manchuria. 
From 1946 to 1949, no CCP leader made any statement about Taiwan’s status. What 
comments they made were articulated in their newspapers or in Xinhua News Agency reports 
and editorials. At the time of the February Twenty-eighth incident, the mass uprising against 
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the Chinese military administration in Taiwan in 1947, they called for solidarity with the 
oppressed people of Taiwan and tried to link rhetorically the latter’s struggle against the 
Chiang regime to their own.68 For all intents and purposes, the CCP just quietly shifted its 
position. Instead of seeing Taiwan as a Japanese colony on the same basis as Korea, which 
the CCP would help to achieve independence, it now treated Taiwan as a part of China. Its 
new approach reflected the general shift in Chinese opinion after the war. When this 
adjustment happened, the CCP focused on fiercely contesting mainland China and Manchuria 
and ignored Taiwan. Chiang confirmed in 1946 that the CCP had not infiltrated Taiwan.69  
After the tide turned in the Chinese Civil War and the prospect of complete victory 
loomed, the CCP started to take Taiwan seriously. By spring 1949, Communist forces had 
won decisively in three massive campaigns, in Manchuria, Beijing and Tianjin, and Huaihai, 
and they were building up momentum to crush the GMD regime. For the first time, the CCP 
declared that it must "liberate Taiwan" on March 15, 1949.70 Its first attempt to breach 
Taiwan’s peripheral defense, which came to be known as the Battle of Guningtou (古寧頭; 
on Quemoy) took place in October 1949 and ended in a resounding defeat for the Communist 
forces. As a result, Mao saw the need to plan painstakingly for the invasion of Taiwan. 
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In the meantime, Chiang was transforming Taiwan into a redoubt to resist the 
Communist efforts to annihilate the Republic of China (ROC) and was trying to secure US 
support to defend Taiwan.71 At this point, the CCP articulated for the first time an 
appreciation of Taiwan’s strategic—but not geostrategic—value. Taking over Taiwan 
became important because the CCP needed to extinguish the GMD regime to fully establish 
its legitimacy. Since the CCP did not have a navy or an air force, it crushed GMD resistance 
on the mainland first and left Taiwan to become, by default, Chiang’s last redoubt.72 But the 
CCP had little doubt that it would take Taiwan.73 The United States had by then declared in 
the China White Paper that it would not interfere in the Chinese Civil War.74 This was 
reaffirmed in January 1950 by President Harry Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
(1893–1971) , who stated that Taiwan was outside the American global defense perimeter 
and the United States would not interfere with a Communist takeover.75 In other words, even 
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though there were views within the US government in the first half of 1950 that the United 
States should rethink its policy on Taiwan, the official US position remained clear.76 The 
general expectation was that it was just a matter of time before Taiwan would be incorporated 
into the PRC.  
 
<A>Elevation to Sacred Territory 
In early 1950, Mao planned to invade Taiwan later in the summer to stub out the ROC,77 
whereas Chiang prepared to put up a staunch defense. Even though Mao was consulted and 
gave his blessings to the North Korean leader before the latter started the Korean War, he had 
not expected this to impact upon Taiwan.78 When North Korea invaded South Korea at the 
end of June, it caught the United States off guard. Truman responded by ordering the US 
Navy "to repel any attack on Formosa" and preempt "attacks … from Formosa on the 
mainland."79 This was a knee-jerk reaction to ensure the Korean War was contained. He had 
not reversed US policy toward Taiwan. But to Mao this revealed the United States’s real—
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imperialist—intention.80 Taiwan became more than a loose end of the Chinese Civil War. He 
now believed the United States had intervened directly to preempt the unification of China. In 
a formal statement issued in response, Premier Zhou Enlai declared, "That Taiwan belongs to 
China is a fact that can never be changed." He added, "This is not just a historical fact but has 
also been confirmed in the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration, and the reality since 
Japan’s surrender,” and he insisted that China would "liberate" Taiwan from the "American 
aggressor."81 Truman’s statement triggered a basic change in how the CCP looked at Taiwan, 
which was transformed into "an inalienable part" of China.82 
Mao and the PRC did not expect or understand Truman’s neutralization statement. 
From their perspective, Truman’s order amounted to an American takeover of Taiwan that 
preempted the completion of the Communist revolution.83 They reacted strongly because they 
had long suspected the United States supported Chiang and intended to frustrate their 
revolutionary goal. With Chiang articulating an ambition to retake the mainland, this 
apparent "reversal" of US policy raised a serious concern: the prospect that the United States 
would help Chiang contest the legitimacy of the PRC. Hence, even as China made a massive 
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military intervention in Korea, Mao ordered the reinforcement of Guangdong’s already 
strong garrison of three corps by another two to five corps, as he became worried about an 
American-backed invasion of Guangdong by Chiang’s forces.84 Mao did not believe 
Truman’s neutralization statement reflected true US intent. Instead, he saw this as a 
preparation to invade China.85 Thus, Taiwan acquired a level of strategic importance that the 
CCP had not previously accorded it.  
Beijing further elevated the importance of Taiwan when the Allied powers worked 
out a peace treaty to settle the Pacific War the following year. It happened as the Allied 
powers excluded any representative from China at the San Francisco Conference (1951) and 
did not require Japan to hand over sovereignty of Taiwan to either Chinese government. With 
the peace treaty apparently perpetuating the American view that Taiwan’s status was 
unsettled, Beijing raised the stake by declaring for the first time that it had a "sacred duty" to 
retake Taiwan.86 Since Japan did renounce its sovereignty over Taiwan in the San Francisco 
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Treaty, and since Taiwan remained under Chinese control, albeit that of the "renegade" 
Chiang regime, Beijing did not need to escalate further.  
The PRC government finally transformed Taiwan into "a sacred territory of our 
country since ancient times" in a Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) editorial in July 1954.87 Its 
authoritativeness was confirmed in the 27th-anniversary speech to commemorate the 
founding of the Communist army by its head, Zhu De, on August 1, 1954, and by a statement 
Premier Zhou made at a central government meeting 10 days later.88  
The immediate causes of this shift were Chiang’s efforts to seek a mutual defense 
treaty with the United States, a development that, from Beijing’s perspective, would put 
Taiwan under American protection.89 Mao was so concerned that he tried to preempt this by 
starting the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–1955).90 Even though Mao failed to deter the 
United States, he gained insights into US policies that proved critical. He ascertained "the 
extent to which the USA and UK were prepared to go over these islands [i.e., Jinmen and 
Mazu] and Taiwan," and finally saw that the United States had no intention to support a ROC 
invasion of the mainland.91 This knowledge allowed Mao to shift focus from defending the 
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PRC against the United States to pressing on with ambitious domestic changes, culminating 
in the launch of the Great Leap Forward.92 Thus, while Mao never gave up on Taiwan, he 
parked the issue for the rest of his rule. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 was not a 
prelude to an invasion of Taiwan. As international relations scholar Thomas Christensen 
explained, it was started to galvanize the nation to support a highly ambitious policy (the 
Great Leap Forward) to catapult the PRC to modernity.93 Mao ended it when he no longer 
needed it. He saw a strategic value in Taiwan, but not a geostrategic one—and not one so 
significant that he would risk a war with the United States over it. 
The impact Truman’s neutralization policy had on Taiwan was no less significant. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it was a godsend to Taipei, as it preempted an imminent PRC 
invasion. This was not how Chiang saw it at the time, however. At first he resented the 
statement, thinking Truman had "ignored China’s sovereignty over Taiwan" and treated 
Taiwan as if it were an American colony.94 Chiang did, nonetheless, take the Truman 
statement at face value and recognize that the United States would not support him to 
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recapture the mainland.95 While he did not give up the dream of reconquering the mainland, 
he seized on the opportunity Truman’s statement offered.96 Chiang used the idea of a 
counterattack "primarily to achieve other goals," the most important of which was to secure 
US aid to ensure the survival of the ROC.97 Indeed, he devoted himself to implementing 
reforms to revitalize governance, defense, and economic capacity. Within weeks, Chiang 
shifted focus from making a military last stand to forming "a new leadership team … in 
charge of rebuilding the party."98 The successful reform was critical to securing a mutual 
defense pact with the United States to ensure the PRC could not invade, in repressing local 
demands for democratic self-government leading to independence, and in deterring the 
Western great powers from making Taiwan an independent country.99 The last was an option 
both the US and British governments examined in the early 1950s. They ditched it, as it 
would have required overpowering Chiang’s increasingly disciplined and well-trained 
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garrison, half a million strong. By insisting that Taiwan was a part of China, Chiang 
unwittingly reinforced the PRC’s claim over Taiwan. As a result, the fate of Taiwan become 
tied to that of the ROC: the people of Taiwan could not decide their own future and what to 
call their state even after democratization. 
 
<A>Implication 
The transformation of the CCP’s view of Taiwan, from seeing it as a Japanese colony to be 
given independence to seeing it, successively, as a Chinese territory of peripheral 
significance, as an inalienable part of China, and finally (between 1943 and 1954) as a sacred 
territory happened as events unfolded in the Pacific War, the Chinese Civil War, and the Cold 
War. The CCP changed its policy toward Taiwan largely in response to unforeseen events. 
From 1949 to 1950, Taiwan took on strategic importance as it became, by default, the last 
holdout against the CCP establishing undisputed control over the whole of China, at a time 
when most of the world recognized Chiang’s regime as the government of China. The CCP 
elevated Taiwan to a matter of central interest only after Truman’s instinctive response to the 
Korean War forced the PRC to postpone indefinitely its plan to invade Taiwan and put an end 
to the ROC.100 The Chinese responses were not based on the geographical dimension of 
Taiwan’s new strategic value, even though it happened at a time when General MacArthur 
articulated most graphically Taiwan’s geostrategic significance—to the United States.  
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MacArthur’s statement was regularly misconstrued by the Chinese to imply that 
Taiwan would be used as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" against China.101 What MacArthur 
actually said was the opposite, viz. if Taiwan were held by forces hostile to the United States 
in a new world war, it "could be compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine 
tender ideally located to accomplish offensive strategy and at the same time checkmate 
defensive or counteroffensive operations by friendly forces based on Okinawa and the 
Philippines."102  
While the geostrategic dimension MacArthur put forth could not have been lost on 
Chinese policy makers, it was the Chinese perception of the Truman statement that brought 
about the basic change in the PRC’s policy. The views and actions of the people of Taiwan 
were irrelevant in this transformation. With slight naval and air capabilities and no doctrine 
by which to project naval or air power, the PRC itself could not use Taiwan in the way 
MacArthur envisaged and did not attach strategic value to Taiwan’s location in the 1950s. 
The reality is that Beijing looked at Taiwan afresh as a result of shifts in Cold War politics. 
Events of the 1950s led to Taiwan being reimagined in the geography of China. It was 
because the Chinese Civil War could not be concluded and was merged into the Cold War 
that Beijing attached strategic value to Taiwan. But Mao was not willing to go to war with 
the United States over Taiwan, a war that Mao knew China could not win. 
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This valuation might have changed as the Cold War ended and the ROC government 
gave up the pretentious claim of sovereignty over the Chinese mainland in the early 1990s, 
after both Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo had died. But by then the PRC had chosen 
to add a geographical dimension to the strategic importance of Taiwan. This development 
reflected military modernization, strategic shifts, and changes in maritime doctrine of the 
PRC that started in the 1980s, as well as a steady rise of Chinese power and ambition. The 
introduction of a new strategic concept called the "first island chain”—which put Taiwan in a 
pivotal place in this maritime defense line—and the commitment to build up a blue water 
navy made Taiwan geostrategically significant to the PRC for the first time. This new 
doctrine chimed with MacArthur’s description of Taiwan as a potential unsinkable aircraft 
carrier for the PRC. Taiwan’s geography thus became a significant consideration. As the PRC 
continues to rise, builds up its naval and airpower, and takes a more assertive approach, 
Taiwan’s geostrategic importance increases. 
 
<A>Conclusions 
This paper shows that Taiwan was not elevated to sacred status because of a sudden 
recognition of Taiwan’s geostrategic significance. The PRC government described Taiwan as 
"a sacred territory" when the United States prevented it from taking Taiwan but before it 
accorded geostrategic value to Taiwan. Needless to say, the two are not mutually exclusive 
but they are not interchangeable either.  
What this paper has demonstrated is that, while the PRC government attaches 
geostrategic importance to Taiwan today, neither it nor its predecessor did so historically. 
This transformation was driven by a change in the ambition and military capabilities of 
China. The dramatic shifts in the way successive governments of China viewed the status of 
Taiwan over the last 150 years happened as a result of unforeseen events and not because of 
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strategic importance inherent in Taiwan’s location. Even after Mao elevated Taiwan to sacred 
status, he failed to see a compelling need to incorporate Taiwan once he realized that Chiang 
could not get US support to attack the mainland and would not tolerate Taiwan independence. 
Taiwan took on significant strategic value in the Maoist period mainly because Mao was 
concerned that Chiang could gain American backing to challenge the legitimacy of the PRC. 
The emergence of a geographic dimension to the strategic importance of Taiwan 
happened in the post-Mao era. This was caused by the replacement of the Maoist doctrine of 
a people’s war (luring an invader deep into the mainland to then destroy it) with forward 
maritime defense and the building up of capabilities to hold the first island chain, of which 
Taiwan is a key component. Beijing began to see geostrategic importance in Taiwan because 
of capability enhancement, new doctrinal development, and a desire to be more assertive.  
The PRC’s contemporary assessment of Taiwan’s geostrategic value is driven by the 
ambition and strategic vision of its leadership. That dynamic has applied most particularly 
since Xi Jinping became leader of China. Xi informed US Secretary of State John Kerry 
(1943–) of his view in 2015 by saying: "The broad Pacific Ocean is vast enough to embrace 
both China and the United States."103 For the PRC, therefore, it becomes essential to 
incorporate Taiwan into the first island chain rather than only to secure the Western extremity 
of the Pacific Ocean. History—and, for that matter, geography—has merely been conscripted 
to "serve the people,” as an old Maoist adage goes. In assessing the geostrategic significance 
of Taiwan to the PRC today, it is important to put this in context. Taiwan’s importance to 
China is not based on an immutable geographical factor but rather on contemporary strategic 
 
103 AFP, "Pacific Ocean Big Enough for China, US: Xi," Australian, May 15, 2015, accessed 
September 10, 2019, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/latest/pacific-ocean-big-
enough-for-china-us-xi/news-story/d5e8555c014c46f2a637aac826ed05a0. 
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calculations that can change if the regime itself is replaced or, for that matter, if China’s 
government no longer subscribes to the maritime strategy of the first island chain. 
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